Tax savings associated with increased levels of debt are often thought to be an important source of returns for private equity funds conducting leveraged buyouts (LBOs). However, as leverage is available to all bidders, the vendors may appropriate any benefits in the form of the takeover premium. For the 100 largest U.S. public-to-private LBOs since 2003, we estimate the size of the additional tax benefits available to private equity purchasers. We find a strong cross-sectional relationship between tax savings and the size of takeover premia; and on average the latter are around twice the size of the former. Consequently, the tax-savings from increasing leverage essentially accrue to the previous shareholders rather than the private equity fund that conducts the LBO. It is, therefore, unlikely that (ex-ante predictable) tax savings are an important source of returns for private equity funds. Furthermore, policy proposals that aim to restrict leverage or the tax-deductibility of debt are likely to have their impact mainly on existing owners of companies.
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth in investors' allocations to Private Equity (PE), and in particular to funds focused on Leveraged Buyouts (LBOs). The size of individual funds has grown significantly -with some funds reaching $20 billion -and, accordingly, larger and larger companies have become potential LBO targets. Indeed, one of the main reasons that Private Equity has attracted so much attention recently is that public companies have increasingly been taken private via an LBO. This has raised questions as to the rationale for LBOs. Clearly, PE funds conduct LBOs only if they believe they can create attractive returns for their investors. These returns could derive from various sources: an increase in efficiency as part of a different governance model that strongly aligns and sharpens management incentives in a highly leveraged environment (see Jensen (1986 Jensen ( , 1989 ); taking advantage of general movements in market prices, i.e. timing the exit until favorable market conditions; or from financial engineering, i.e. reducing the post-tax cost of capital by employing a much higher proportion of debt in the capital structure. In this paper we focus on this latter source of potential returns.
Not surprisingly, politicians and the media have been quick to notice the potential impact of LBOs of national tax revenues. Tax shields associated with debt interest payments can quickly transform a large net contributor into a non-tax payer. However, the size of potential tax savings is not straightforward to estimate, since these depend on numerous factors, such as the dynamics of the capital structure, the type of debt, the projections of future earnings, as well as carried forward tax positions. The first contribution of this paper is to quantify the size of the expected corporate tax savings associated with LBOs (see Graham (1996 Graham ( , 2000 Graham ( , 2001 for a discussion of the general issues regarding the value of debt tax shields). Whilst absolute $ amounts of taxes may hit the headlines, it is really the size of the tax savings relative to the value of the acquired firm that is of most interest. However, systematic evidence on enterprise values is only available for the subset of LBO transactions associated with the acquisition of public companies, since market values do not exist for private companies and transaction values are often not disclosed. Consequently, in this paper we focus on these public-to-private LBOs.
The growth of public-to-private LBOs has been most marked in the U.S. Between 2003-08 there were 259 LBOs of companies that were listed on a U.S. stock exchange, which had a combined transaction value of $635 bn. In this paper we focus on the largest 100 companies within this group (which comprised 80% of the total value). In each case we produce various scenarios for the net present value (NPV) of the anticipated additional tax savings, and compare this value with the observed enterprise value and the value of the takeover premium. As part of this analysis we propose an alternative way of measuring takeover premia, which takes account of the enterprise value of the acquired firm, rather than the more conventional approach of focusing on the premium offered to equity holders.
Relating the anticipated tax savings to the takeover premium allows us to ask our central question: who benefits from the tax savings associated with increased leverage? It is conventional to assume these accrue to the investors in the PE fund. However, access to leverage is available, on similar terms, to all the established PE sponsors. 1 Testing this proposition is not straightforward. The takeover premium paid by private equity funds will reflect all sorts of unobservable expectations about revenue and margin growth, efficiencies, movements in market valuations, etc. as well as any potential Furthermore, most large deals, of the sort we analyze in this paper, involve multiple competing bidders, since boards of public companies fear legal action from shareholders if they acquiesce to a single bid without testing whether other bidders would pay more. Often a potential LBO target will employ an investment bank to run a formal auction; sometimes the board of the target company will run a less formal auction process, involving multiple potential acquirers. Either way, provided the takeover process is reasonably competitive, and private equity sponsors have similar access to debt financing, then we would expect that ex ante predictable tax savings associated with the LBO -of the sort we estimate in this papershould be capitalized into the acquisition price. In this case, the party that benefits from the leverage in LBOs is likely to be the vendor -in our case the public equity investors -rather than the investors in the PE fund. As far as we are aware this is the first paper to make this important observation. tax benefits. So in general we would anticipate that the takeover premium should exceed our estimates of the anticipated tax savings. In cross-sectional regressions this is indeed what we find: on average the takeover premium is around twice the size of the capitalized tax savings. However, we find strong cross-sectional relationship between these two variables, which is consistent with the hypothesis that tax savings are captured by vendors via the takeover premium.
Our work builds on a similar analysis that Kaplan (1989) performed on a sample of LBOs from the earlier 1980s. Since that time, however, various factors have changed.
Foremost, interest rates decreased by about 10 percentage points and conditions on debt became much more flexible. As we detail in Section 2, syndicated loan markets have developed significantly and institutional loans comprised the majority of LBO debt in recent years. Whereas in the 1980s leveraged loans were provided by banks and had fixed amortization schedules, institutional loans -mostly provided by credit and hedge fundshave a bullet payment at maturity. During the term a borrower is only obliged to use a certain fraction of any excess cash to amortize debt. Clearly, this provides great flexibility to the borrower and the sponsor, as defaulting on debt is less likely in lower performing years. It further allows the PE sponsor to use higher levels of debt, as more cash is available for interest payments. The downside (at least for us) is that estimating future tax savings has become much less straightforward. The size of potential debt tax shields in every year is determined by the amount of interest expenses in that year, which depends on the level of outstanding debt principal. Interim amounts of debt are a function of initial LBO debt and a company's post-LBO performance. Consequently, in addition to obtaining detailed information on the size and terms of the various tranches of debt in the capital structure, one also has to make assumptions regarding a company's ability to generate excess cash and the fractions used to pay down principal.
In this paper, we run a number of simulations for each company in our sample, estimating the level of excess cash flows in the years following the buyout. We base our projections on a company's most recent performance and incorporate various parameters to form different scenarios. Depending on a company's individual situation, we determine the size of the potential tax shield that could be used in any particular year, and apply instruments such as tax loss carry forwards and backwards for any remainder. We capitalize these post-LBO tax shields using the costs of each underlying debt tranche and measure the excess value over the -hypothetically -carried forward pre-LBO tax shields. Depending on underlying projections, we estimate that the 100 largest LBOs in our sample produced incremental corporate tax savings with an NPV of around $50 billion.
Having estimated the capitalized incremental tax savings associated with the LBOs, we relate these to the takeover premia paid by PE sponsors. Traditionally in the literature takeover premia have been computed on equity values. However, we argue that measuring the takeover premium on the enterprise value is more relevant from an acquirer's perspective. To complete the transaction, the PE sponsor has to acquire the target company's shares (at a premium), but also needs to refinance the pre-LBO debt due to change of control covenants in a company's credit agreements. Consequently, it is the enterprise value of the target firm that defines the PE sponsor's cost basis, and the amount of capital that he needs to put on top of a company's enterprise value is of most relevance.
As we show, depending on a target company's pre-LBO debt level, the premium measured in this way can differ significantly from the premium per equity share that has been used in papers focusing on conventional M&A (see Eckbo (2009) for a literature review on takeover premia). We find a strong cross-sectional relationship between our measure of the capitalized tax benefits and the premium to initial enterprise value paid in the LBO transactions.
Various interesting policy implications follow from our analysis. In particular, moves by national tax authorities to limit the tax deductibility of debt interest are likely to have their main impact on existing owners of assets, rather than private equity acquirers.
Essentially, the potential benefits of highly leveraged transactions would be reduced, and this would be reflected in the price that private equity funds should be prepared to pay. It is worth noting that it is not certain that the actual amount of leverage employed by the private equity funds in their portfolio companies will necessarily change, given the optionlike payoffs associated with the profit-share arrangements enjoyed by the executives working for private equity funds (see Axelson et al., 2010) . However, limitations on debt interest tax deductibility would reduce the competitive advantage that financial sponsors enjoy -in respect of financial engineering -over conventional corporate acquirers (who generally use much less debt). Consequently, it is likely that any such restrictions on the tax deductibility of interest expenses would reduce private equity sponsored deals as a proportion of total M&A activity.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section two we give a short introduction into the characteristics of LBOs as well as some background on the leveraged finance market and its recent developments that are essential to understand our methodology. The third section describes our sample selection and the data we use, and illustrates the methodology we apply in our scenario-based approach. Section four contains the empirical results. Section five concludes.
Leveraged Buyouts
Over the six years before the financial crisis hit Western economies, LBOs have increased significantly, both in number and average deal size. This is particularly the case for publicto-private takeovers in the U.S. As Table I shows, in total private equity sponsors paid about $635 billion to acquire the 259 companies that were taken private from 2003-08. The purchase price includes acquiring the debt and equity, as well as (not insignificant) transaction costs. If we focus on the equity component, the overall market capitalization of the bought-out companies prior to the takeover announcement was about $413 billion and shareholders received immediate capital gains of $108 billion in these public-to-private LBOs. This equates to a weighted average premium for shareholders of 26.2% compared to the pre-takeover equity market value of these companies.
This growth in LBO activity was mainly driven by three factors. First, the amount of funds raised by private equity investors has grown tremendously in recent years; see Figure I . Second, debt for leveraged transactions became more and more available. Third, the growth of club deals -involving multiple private equity sponsors -drove ever-larger LBOs and, hence, increased the average transaction value.
In this paper we focus on the largest 100 buyouts during the 2003-08 period. For each of these companies we obtain detailed accounting, financing and transaction data, most of which has to be hand collected. To give a feel for the data, we present summary information on the largest 25 deals in our sample in Table II .
Characteristics and structure of Leveraged Buyouts
LBOs involve the acquisition of a company by financial sponsors who aim to achieve at least a controlling stake in the target company. In addition to the equity contribution of the private equity investor, LBOs are financed to a substantial extent with debt, which amplifies the final returns on the investor's equity investment. These funds are initially used to purchase target's equity, to repay existing debt as well as to pay transaction fees.
We give an illustrative example of the sources and uses of funds in LBOs in Table III . The debt is provided by banks and institutional lenders as a structured package. Collateral for the loans is provided by the target's cash flows and assets. During their tenure as owners, the private equity investor tries to create value before exiting the investment by taking the company public or by selling to a strategic, or another financial, investor (see Kaplan and Strömberg (2008) ).
Leveraged Finance and changes in the debt capital markets
The debt and its structure play an important role in LBOs, as it is one of the relevant drivers to maximize the final returns on the sponsor's equity investment. An LBO debt package consists of several debt tranches with different characteristics. These tranches mainly differ in seniority and collateralization, which results in different terms and margins. We give an example of the type of debt structure that was typical during our sample period in Table IV. In general, debt tranches can be divided into leveraged loan and high-yield notes or mezzanine tranches. The leveraged loan part usually consists of at least two tranches: a term loan facility and a revolving credit facility. Leveraged loans have a floating interest rate with a margin above a pre-defined base rate. One or more tranches of high-yield notes may be issued within several months after a successful LBO (bridge loans of up to one year are used to fill this gap). These notes can be either publicly listed or privately placed, and have usually a fixed-rate coupon (see Axelson et. Al. (2010) for evidence on LBO capital structures in both the U.S. and Europe).
Although, lending multiples in the 2000s were very similar to the 1980s, conditions and structures of leveraged loan tranches and high-yield notes have changed significantly over the last three decades (see Stucke (2009) for a comparison of both periods). The loan part of a typical LBO debt package in the 1980s had a pre-agreed amortization scheduleusually on a straight-line basis -resulting in a full amortization of the loan over its term (so-called Term Loan A). Depending on its size, a loan was syndicated between a number of mostly national commercial banks who -in old school fashion -still had a strong focus on a company's fixed assets to collateralize loans ("asset-based lending"). Due to the higher amount of fixed charges and over-collateralization with assets, the total size of the loan part was limited. Additional leverage during that time came through the invention of high-yield notes ("junk bonds"). Until the early 1980s, no market for bond issuances below investment grade level existed. The only high-yield notes were those of so-called fallen angels, i.e. previously investment grade borrowers who ran into financial distress. However, with declining interest rates and easing regulations the market in issuing junk bonds developed quickly until the early 1990s when the U.S. fell into recession.
In the mid to late 1990s, private equity investments were mainly driven by strong growth opportunities of companies operating in the telecom, IT and media sector.
Although, less excessive in deal values and debt multiples, some important developments took place in that decade that should pave the way towards the boom in the 2000s.
First, the primary and secondary market for syndicated loans experienced a high degree of standardization. Forms and documentation at issuance and throughout the lifetime of loans were standardized and clear roles and mandates were defined for all parties involved. Investment banks established trading desks for syndicated loans, such that market prices were tracked and even small fractions of loans could be traded over the counter.
Brokers helped to match buyers and sellers, and bid-ask spreads were converging. Naturally, a viable secondary market leads to higher liquidity in the primary market.
Second, resulting from the experience that few leveraged loans involved in LBOs were ever held until maturity, but were refinanced after a couple of years at a company's exit, the need for a structure that supported the amortization of a loan until maturity was no longer seen as a key criteria. In addition to this, amortization schedules shifted from straight-line amortization towards progressive amortization, following the progressive character of a company's free cash flows in the years after the LBO due to intended EBITDA growth.
Third, unlike traditional models, cash-flow based lending started to determine the size of the loan depending on a company's future cash flows, rather than focusing on the amount of fixed assets being available as collateral -many telecom, IT and media companies did not have substantial amounts of tangible assets at that time.
Fourth, leveraged and mezzanine loans, as well as high-yield notes were increasingly demanded by institutional investors, such as credit funds, mutual funds and hedge funds. Many of these were then securitized and refinanced by issuing short and medium-term notes, or asset-backed commercial paper programs. In this context, institutional investors are more interested in a spread of additional 25 or 50 basis points, rather than in a regular amortization of debt principal. Consequently, the volume of leveraged loans with a bullet payment at maturity (Term Loan B) increased strongly (see Acharya et al. (2007) on institutional investors and LBOs). In addition to these changes, new debt instruments such as second-lien tranches and covenant-lite loans emerged in recent years (see Miller and Chew (2008) ). Some of these more recent inventions disappeared during the turmoil in credit markets, but are an important feature of the sample of deals that are analyzed in this paper.
Sample and Methodology

Sample data
Our sample contains detailed information on the 100 largest public-to-private LBOs of U.S. companies listed on a U.S. stock exchange between 2003-08. The U.S. is the best market to investigate since it has by far the most public-to-private LBOs. Furthermore all transactions are in the same jurisdiction with identical market and regulatory circumstances which avoids unobservable biases (in contrast to the European LBO market for example).
To identify LBO transactions we used Bureau van Dijk's Zephyr M&A Database.
We cross checked the sample against the results of an identical query on Standard & Poor's (S&P) CapitalIQ database to make sure we have a comprehensive set of transactions. In total we identified 259 public-to-private LBOs during the period. The work involved in analyzing each transaction is considerable, and so we focus on the 100 largest transactions.
As the criteria for size we chose the enterprise value observed in the transactions, consisting of the equity purchase price for outstanding shares and options plus the target's net debt. On this basis each LBO in our sample had an enterprise value in excess of $500 million. targets continued filing with the SEC due to a public bond offering; this allowed us to validate our scenarios for a part of our sample in early years after the LBO. The portion of deals with an amortizing bank loan (Term Loan A) tranche substantially decreased due to the substitution with institutional (Term Loan B) loans; moreover high-yield notes with a PIK option, which are generally held by institutional investors, increased significantly in 2006-07. Buyouts in our sample were most common in the consumer discretionary industry, followed by the IT and the health care sectors. Table VI shows details on the pre-LBO valuation of our sample companies based on the one-day premium. Prior to the announcement of an LBO our 100 companies had a combined market capitalization of $334 billion, and a total enterprise value of $426 billion.
Net debt equaled 17.5% of the enterprise value (22 companies had a negative net debt position). On average, interest expenses were 16.0% of a company's last twelve months (LTM) earnings before interest taxes, interest, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA), and 22.6% of LTM EBITDA-Capex.
Detailed company data for our sample came from annual and quarterly reports filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). We extracted information on debt levels and interest rates, tax details, performance data, etc. from the last three annual reports as well as the most recent quarterly report prior to the LBO. For companies that continued filing with the SEC after the LBO we collected post-LBO data for controlling purposes as well. Data on each individual LBO structure came from proxy statements filed with the SEC, company reports following the transaction, and Reuters Loan Pricing Corporation. Beside the overall equity purchase price we collected details on the financing structure of each LBO including individual debt tranches with terms and pricings, the sponsor's equity contribution as well as transaction fees. Where available we also took management projections of future performance numbers such as EBITDA and Capex levels.
For interest payment calculations we use the 3 month US$ LIBOR which typically serves as the base rate for floating rate debt tranches. We obtained these numbers from the British Bankers' Association.
To calculate the effective premium of a final bid we used a company's stock price one day prior to the earliest public announcement of a possible takeover. This can either be the day prior to the final bid or a first bid (in case of multiple bids), or the day prior to the rumor of a possible LBO or the sale of the company. We collected these dates from the Zephyr database, which also tracks information on announcement and rumor activity prior to takeovers. To correct for possible leakage of news about intended takeovers in the market we also calculated the stock prices one month and two months before this earliest date, adjusted by the associated industry sub-index of the S&P 500. We obtained the time series of stock prices from the Center for Research in Security Prices and the S&P 500 subindexes from Global Financial Data.
Methodology for calculating the tax benefits from LBOs
The first main objective is to determine the increase in NPV of future tax shields resulting from higher interest payments. As mentioned before, this is not straightforward in the case of LBOs involving a number of debt tranches, with different terms and conditions, and finite holding periods.
The significant increase in a company's debt and, therefore, the value of higher tax shields is only temporarily. Private equity investors aim -and are required by their lenders -to free up cash and pay back LBO debt as quickly as possible, to reduce the default risk of the portfolio company. Therefore, the traditional permanent debt approach -whereby the leverage used at the time of the acquisition is assumed to persist into the future -would exaggerate the value of debt tax shields. Instead, we create a model that determines each company's debt and tax situation for every year following the LBO and simulate different future outcomes based on a several input parameters. As a result, we arrive at a number of estimations for future tax savings and their risk-adjusted NPVs that follow different scenarios. With respect to the holding period of a company, we follow a conservative estimation by modeling tax shields of up to 10 years. On the one hand, 10 years is the maximum term of any LBO's junior debt tranche. On the other hand, LBOs during our observation period involved so much debt that it is unlikely to exit them after e.g. 3-4 years.
Even in our more progressive scenarios the mean and median company needs at least 6-7 years to return to acceptable debt levels in the area of 30-40% of the enterprise value.
The most important variable in our model is the future development of EBITDA for each company. As a basis for future EBITDA scenarios we take the normalized LTM EBITDA of a company. As PE investors are primarily interested in companies with the potential to grow EBITDA we assume different growth rates for the following years. This growth can be either achieved by increasing sales and revenues (ideally without additional capital expenditures), or by margin improvements. The normalized LTM Capex level serves as a basis for future Capex estimations. In some of our scenarios we incorporate reductions in Capex as this often occurs after an LBO. To estimate future depreciation and amortization (D&A) we maintain the LTM D&A level. Where given, we incorporate management's projections for EBITDA and Capex into our scenarios as well.
Starting with the EBITDA we continue with two parallel computations for every year following the LBO. First we aim to give an accurate estimation of a company's earnings before taxes (EBT) in order to obtain the current year's tax provision or benefit, the amount of tax losses carried backwards or forwards and, therefore, the resulting tax shield that can be used in any particular year. Second, we estimate the current year's free cash flow in order to determine the amount of principal debt repayment assuming a certain percentage used as cash sweep. Since the amount of principal debt repayment in every year determines the borrower's interest obligation in the following year, our computations have an iterative character.
To calculate the EBT we deduct historic depreciation and amortization (D&A), amortization resulting from financing and transaction costs, as well as interest expenses for that year. In case of a positive EBT, all tax shields from additional interest expenses can be used in that particular year and we also get the amount of tax provision (after incorporating potential tax losses carried forwards from previous years which may serve as an additional tax shield), which implies a reduction of the free cash flow. In case of a negative EBT only those expenses down to an EBT of zero plus any available tax losses carried backwards amount, which results in a tax benefit, can be used as a tax shield. The uncovered amount results in a tax loss carry forward which is able to shield tax obligations in future years.
To calculate the free cash flow we deduct projected capital expenditures and interest expenses from the EBITDA and either deduct tax payments or add a tax refund. A certain percentage of this free cash flow is then used to repay debt principal beginning with the most senior tranche following the other debt tranches by priority. We also need to estimate the corporate tax rate of each company. Of course, statutory and effective tax rates can differ significantly, and we are not able to observe post-LBO tax rates (as accounts usually cease to be published). Consequently, we estimate a company's post-LBO effective tax rate from its public annual reports prior to the LBO. In our calculations we use the average effective tax rate from the three fiscal years prior to the LBO after adjusting for eventually used tax loss carry forwards (backwards) resulting from losses in previous years. This leads to a median effective tax rate of 36.6% and an average effective tax rate of 36.3% with a standard deviation of 3.5%. For controlling purposes of the final results we also conduct our calculations with the U.S. federal tax rate of 35.0% for all companies in our sample.
The calculation of the present value of the tax shield for every year following the LBO is done as follows. Depending on the future EBITDA, Capex and other assumptions, resulting tax outcomes as well as the amount of cash sweep that is used to repay debt principal, the amount of interest expenses is calculated for every year after the LBO.
Depending on the riskiness of each debt tranche, the generated fraction of all interest expenses for any particular year is capitalized using the individual interest rate of the underlying tranche. After the calculation of these risk-adjusted present values of future interest expenses we multiply by the effective tax rate of the company. Next, we calculate which amount of these interest expenses can serve as a tax shield in that particular year. Therefore, after offsetting "negative tax shields" by individual tax loss carried backwards for the first three years after an LBO, we correct these numbers by carrying forward tax losses to future years in which their value (accordingly capitalized with respect to the individual time of their sourcing and the time of their using) might be used in parts or in total as an "additional" tax shield.
To calculate the overall increase in the present value of interest expenses we have to deduct those amounts of capitalized interest expenses that would have existed had there been no LBO transaction. We assume the average three-year amount of interest expenses is a reasonable estimate for future non-LBO interest expenses provided there was no increase in issued debt in a company's recent past; in such cases we use only the most recent amount of interest expenses as a projection. The present value of these assumed interest expenses is then calculated by using the three-months US$ LIBOR plus a margin according to the company's pre-LBO rating, which reflects the riskiness of the former company's debt tax shield. After multiplying by the effective tax rate we get the debt tax shields that would have occurred without an LBO. Finally we sum up the differences in the present values of all tax shields in every year.
We run this scenario-based approach on our entire sample following different underlying assumptions. The most important input parameters that can differ, and influence the level of principal debt repayments, are the growth rates of future EBITDA, initial reductions and future growth of Capex and percentages of the free cash flows used as cash sweep.
Methodology for calculating the takeover premium
To test whether the estimated tax benefits from LBOs impact on the price paid for the company, we need to estimate the value of the takeover premium. Traditionally, the literature has focused on the equity premium -how much equity holders are paid relative to the market capitalization of the company prior to the bid. As mentioned earlier, there are different ways of defining the pre-bid share price, depending on whether rumors of potential bids start impacting on the market price. We use three different bases for determining the pre-bid equity value: the stock price one day prior to the earliest available public information to determine the premium, and the stock prices one month and two months before the earliest announcement date (adjusted by the associated S&P 500 industry sub-index). As we will see in the next section, and in line with previous work on takeover premia, there is evidence that information leaks into the market, especially in the month prior to formal announcement (see Schwert (1996) , Wright et al. (2007) , Bargeron et al. (2008) , Eckbo (2009) ).
We also propose an alternative basis for measuring the premium, which we argue is more relevant for LBOs. When taking a public company private, PE sponsors focus on the enterprise value, rather than just the equity market capitalization of the company. This is because they will have to re-finance the existing debt, which becomes immediately due if there is a change of ownership or control. Refinancing a company's debt prior to maturity is likely to be associated with certain costs, such as a penalty for early amortization of loans or a call premium for issued bonds. However, investors who take over a public company do not have to pay a control premium on a company's debt. Therefore, acquiring the debt component of a company's enterprise value does involve some costs, but these are probably much lower than the control premium that must be paid to equity holders. Consequently, as we illustrate in the next section, the premium on enterprise value is in many cases significantly different from the equity premium. In our regression analysis we focus on the premium measured relative to the overall enterprise value, and estimate the cross-sectional relationship with the NPV of the incremental tax savings. As mentioned before, we calculate the premium relative to both the equity and the enterprise value for the one day, one-month and two-month (adjusted) periods prior to the earliest announcement date. The adjusted one-and two-month premia are significantly higher than the premia based on the day before the first public information of a possible takeover (as indicated by a paired t-test). This is consistent with rumors of possible bids starting to impact on market prices in the weeks before the first publicly available information. The much higher percentage premia in 2003 are a result of lower equity valuations due to weak stock markets at that time. Figure II illustrates the relationship between the conventional premium per share and the premium on enterprise value. In some cases the difference is significant. For instance, a 25% equity premium can relate into an EV premium from as low as 12% to as high as 31%. Indeed, since some companies have a negative amount of net debt, i.e. more cash and short-term investments than debt on their balance sheets, the equity value can be higher than the enterprise value. Consequently, the percentage premium will be higher relative to a company's EV. The diagonal dotted line separates the companies with a negative amount of net debt. Table VIII shows that the leverage -measured as a multiple of EBITDA or EBITDA-Capex -that was used to finance LBOs increased significantly until 2007. There are two major reasons for this. First, the increased supply of institutional debt led to everhigher lending limits for senior loans as a multiple of a target's EBITDA. This is particularly remarkable since the effective interest rates for leveraged loans increased as well until mid-2007. To some extent this trend can be explained by the growth of secondlien loans and institutional loan tranches without fixed amortizations of debt principal: cash was increasingly available for interest payments and, hence, higher debt levels. Second, the supply of high-yield notes to already higher leveraged targets (with respect to higher levels of senior loans) remained relatively stable until 2007, accepting lending against ever more sensitive parts of a target's EBITDA. One reason for this is the increased supply of "payment in kind", or PIK, notes that gave the borrower the option to avoid cash interest payments by issuing additional securities.
Results
Sample characteristics
For the median company in our sample the interest expenses as a proportion of the pre-LBO EBITDA increased from 14.2% to 60.3% as a result of the LBO. This latter figure excludes interest on PIK tranches of debt; if this is included the proportion increases to 64.6%. Relative to EBITDA-Capex interest expenses constituted 19.1% before the LBO, and increased to 82.2% in the first year after the LBO (86.8% including interest payments on PIK tranches). These are remarkable changes to the capital structure, with significant implications for future tax savings. Figure III illustrates the change in the capital structure and interest obligations for the average company in our sample.
When looking at the percentage of sponsors' equity contributions, one can see that these did not, on average, decrease as a result of increased levels of debt since the multiples of total deal values went up simultaneously. In other words sponsors' were not able to additionally lever up their own equity contribution despite a higher availability of debt. Table IX shows our estimates of the NPV of the incremental future debt and amortization tax shields as fractions of paid premia for different scenarios. We show results from eight scenarios with different underlying assumptions affecting the future excess cash flows of our sample companies and the portion of this cash used to repay debt principal.
Value of tax shields following our scenario-based approach
The assumptions of scenario one result in amounts of excess cash flows at the higher end of what might be possible. All cash is then used in every year to repay debt principal. Hence, the amount of outstanding debt and implied interest expenses in future years decrease quickly and the additional tax shields become comparably smaller. In scenario eight we use assumptions resulting in relatively lower excess cash flows in future years. Only the minimum of these amounts is then used to repay debt principal. Hence, the companies under this scenario pay higher interest expenses, resulting in comparably higher additional tax shields. Figure IV shows the percentage of outstanding debt principal for these two extreme scenarios for the mean and median company over ten years following the LBO. Over the first two to three years the amounts of outstanding debt principal do not differ very much. In later years higher differences in interest payments are partly offset due to stronger capitalization effects. Thus, the numbers in Table IX vary in a limited range throughout all scenarios (this is visualized in Figure V) . It should be mentioned that the scenario most similar to PE sponsors' LBO models is likely to be at the lower end, i.e.
represented by scenarios one to four. Debt principal repayments as low, for example, as in scenario eight would not occur in reality. Such a slow pace would result in covenant breaches of agreed debt-to-EBITDA ratios in credit agreements, and PE sponsors would face substantial problems selling a company that is still so highly leveraged.
For the median company in our sample the present value of the additional tax shields is in the range of 52.8% to 68.8% of the one-day premium (in cash terms). 18% to 31% of the companies have new tax shields that exceed the value of the paid premium.
Measuring the value of higher tax shields as a fraction of the one-month and two-month adjusted premia results in somewhat lower values: the present values of those tax shields compared to the adjusted premia are in the range of 40.3% to 58.9% for the median company. Only 6% to 23% of the companies in our sample have additional tax shields in excess of the adjusted paid premia. Compared to the former market capitalizations of our companies (calculated on the basis of the non-adjusted premia) the present value of these new future tax shields is in the range of 11.6% to 15.9%.
Regression analysis of takeover premia
So far we have shown that the ex ante predictable tax savings associated with LBOs are significant relative to the estimated takeover premia. The takeover premia in our sample averages $767 million ($864 and $843 million for the 1-month and 2-month adjusted premia) and the projected tax savings average $489 million, using scenario 4 in Table IX. Whilst the size of the tax savings relative to the takeover premia are interesting in their own right, it is clearly important to test whether there is a cross-sectional relationship between the two variables. A positive relationship would be consistent with the hypothesis that investors appropriate a share of any tax benefits associated with increased leverage.
Table X presents results of our regression analysis. The dependent variable is the takeover premium paid in the transaction, normalized by the pre-LBO enterprise value, measured one day, one month and two months before the first announcement. The main explanatory variable of interest is the capitalized value of the incremental tax shields, also measured relative to the pre-LBO enterprise value, following the increase in financial leverage. We focus initially on the estimates for the tax savings produced using scenario 4 (see Table IX ), which is towards the middle of the various possible measures.
We also include the fraction of equity provided by the private equity fund. Our hypothesis is that private equity sponsors will tend to maximize the amount of debt they raise for a transaction -since they attempt to maximize the expected return on equity, given their option-like incentives. This amount will clearly depend upon the state of the leveraged finance markets, as well as any particular features of the target company. We capture these market and company-specific effects using time and industry fixed effects. For those deals where the amount of equity invested is high (allowing for fixed effects) we test whether this reflects aggressive bidding by the private equity fund -in which case the impact on the premium would be positive. We also include two dummy variables to reflect the financial structure of the deal: whether there is amortizing Term Loan A in the capital structure, and whether (non-amortizing) PIK debt is used. We would expect the main impact of the use (or not) of Term Loan A would be reflected in the tax shield variable -since having Term Loan A reduces the quantum of debt and so tends to reduce the tax shields -but it is possible that there might be an independent effect on the premium if transaction prices are influenced by leverage (as suggested by Axelson et. al. (2010) ). We therefore expect the coefficient on Term Loan A to be negative, and the coefficient on the PIK dummy to be positive.
Finally, we include a dummy variable that captures whether the initially announced bid was equal to the price that received final shareholder approval, or whether there was an increase in the initially offered price. This could have either been the case if another private equity firm stepped in and offered a higher price, the board of directors rejected a publicly announced initial offer from the private equity firm, or shareholders considered the offered share premium being too low. This variable attempts to capture the extent of competition, which would be expected to impact on the ability of the shareholders to appropriate the tax benefits. In practice it is difficult to measure how competitive the bidding process is, since the board of directors can always threaten to open the bid process to another bidder -under so-called "go-shop" agreements -and so a good board of directors will negotiate hard even with a sole bidder. Nonetheless, we include this variable to see if we can identify any such effects.
We first present the results excluding the year and industry fixed effects.
Irrespective of the date at which we measure the premium we find a very strong and positive cross-sectional relationship between the present value of the future incremental tax shields and the premium paid. The estimated coefficient varies from 0.67 (for the premium measure one day before announcement) to 1.11 (one month before) to 1.49 (two months before). This increase reflects the information leakage observed earlier, whereby share prices drift upwards in the period before the formal announcement. Although many other factors -such as the anticipated (but unobservable) efficiency improvements etc. -will impact on the premium that private equity funds are prepared to pay, there is strong evidence that the estimated tax benefits have a strong influence. Similar results are obtained once we include year and industry fixed effects, with the range of coefficients on the tax savings increasing slightly to 0.80 to 1.66, and again being highly significant.
We also find evidence that higher equity contributions by the private equity sponsor are associated with higher premia. This is consistent with the hypothesis that once the private equity funds have borrowed the maximum amount of debt, the competitiveness of the bidding process will be reflected in the equity check they are prepared to write. At the sample mean, a one-standard deviation increase in the equity contribution is associated with an increase in the premium from 22.4% to 26.0%, using the one-month regressions including fixed effects.
In terms of the capital structure variables, we find weak evidence that the use of amortizing Term Loan A debt reduces takeover premia (over and above any effect on the interest tax shield). On the other hand, we find no significant effect in any of the regressions of our dummy variable for the use of PIK debt. We also do not find that our measure of the competitiveness of the bid process has any effect, although we suspect this is because all bid processes in public-to-private deals in the US involve the board seeking competitive bids, or testing the proposed bid against the market (using recent transactions and fair value opinions from bankers).
Robustness checks
We run various checks to verify the robustness of these findings. The results in the previous section used the input parameters from scenario 4 to generate the incremental tax savings. Table XI For the one-month (two-month) adjusted premia coefficients range from 1.14 to 1.23 (1.57 to 1.79). Under all scenarios the incremental tax shields are again significant at the 99% level in these cross-sectional regressions.
An important part of our analysis involves estimating the effective marginal corporate tax rate for our sample of LBOs. We next test the sensitivity of our results to these estimates by substituting the statutory 35% federal tax rate for all companies. The results from re-running the regressions with the tax shields estimated on this basis are presented in Table XII . In all cases, the estimated coefficients on the tax shield increase slightly, which is consistent with the fact that we estimated the average effective tax rate to be slightly above 35%. The statistical significance remains, with only the Term Loan A dummy losing some significance at the one month premium.
Finally, we test our hypothesis that the premium on enterprise value is a more relevant measure for investors when considering the price they are prepared to bid. We run the same regressions for the cash premium relative to a company's equity value. Accordingly, we relate the NPV of the higher debt tax shields to the equity value, rather than the enterprise value. In none of our regressions do we find similar significance compared to our enterprise value approach. Only the additional tax shields relative to the two months adjusted premia (including year and industry fixed effects) show weak significance at the 5% level.
Conclusions
This paper estimates the extent of the incremental tax savings produced by the 100 largest U.S. public-to-private leveraged buyouts over the period 2003-08. The capital structures of these transactions are complex and differ significantly from those observed in earlier periods. Many of the transactions occurred in the years just before the financial crisis when debt was abundant and available on very favorable terms, resulting in the very high leverage we observe in many of the deals in our sample. Prior to their purchase by private equity funds, the ratio of net debt to EBITDA in our sample of companies averaged 1.5; the LBO transactions increased this ratio, on average, to 7.6. In terms of interest payments, these rose from an average of 22.6% of free cash flow (EBITDA-Capex) before the LBO to 85.4% in the first year after the LBO. However, the capital structure can change rapidly due to the impact of cash-sweep provisions in typical loan contracts, and so estimating the anticipated tax savings is complex. We model the future cash flows and capital structures under a variety of scenarios to derive a range of estimates for the net present value of the incremental tax shields generated by the LBOs. For these 100 largest transactions, the tax savings totaled around $50 billion, which explains, in part, the political attention that LBOs have been attracting in many countries in recent years.
Since most private equity funds are able to leverage deals, and because the typical public-to-private deal involves competition between multiple bidders, we conjecture that these tax benefits should largely accrue to the vendors of the companies, i.e. the public shareholders, via the premium that is paid to them. To test this hypothesis we estimate cross-sectional regressions relating the premium to the capitalized tax savings. Since private equity funds have to both acquire the equity and refinance the debt in the target companies, we argue that the premium should be measured relative to the enterprise value. This is in contrast to existing literature, which has focused on the premium paid to equity holders. Clearly, the premium that private equity funds will be prepared to pay will not only reflect the anticipated tax savings but also the unobservable expected efficiency improvements and changes in market valuation. On average we find that the present value of additional future tax shields that result from the substantial increase in a company's debt level and interest expenses (as well as to a minor extent from higher amortization caused by fees and expenses of the transaction) are around 50% of the premium paid. We also find a strong, positive, cross-sectional relationship between our estimated tax savings and the takeover premium. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that vendors appropriate much of the tax savings resulting from LBOs.
Consequently, we argue that tax savings associated with financial engineering are unlikely to be a source of value creation for private equity investors. This is in sharp contrast to the commonly expressed view that private equity funds returns are largely derived at the expense of taxpayers. Of course, these highly leveraged structures may have other beneficial effects that could accrue to investors, such as beneficial incentive effectsby reducing free cash flow, or by sharpening incentives for managers more generally. Also, given that the debt in LBOs is pushed into the portfolio companies on a non-recourse basis, LBOs creates leveraged equity investment opportunities for investors that might be difficult to imitate. And the option-like remuneration of private equity fund executives -through their carried interests in the funds -means that they have incentives to increase risk and expected equity returns through using leverage. So even if governments restricted the tax benefits associated with debt, as some have recently done, it is still likely that private equity buyouts would still be leveraged. The main impacts of a restriction on interest deductibility would, we argue, be to reduce a important edge enjoyed by private equity funds when bidding against potential corporate acquirers, and, more significantly, to reduce the value of all companies that were potential targets for LBOs. The equity purchase price at premium is the value of all equity claims at the final bid price. Outstanding net debt presents the latest available information about each company's gross debt prior to the closing of the transaction reduced by the cash at hand of the company; these numbers come from the most recent annual or quarterly report or the first post-LBO report in case of an ongoing filing with the SEC. Combined, these numbers determine each company's enterprise value at final bid. The sum of all enterprise values of these 25
LBOs is approximately $380 bn. The equity from the Private Equity sponsor stands for the amount of capital provided by private equity funds. The final column shows the percentage of this equity injection compared to the enterprise value.
All values in million $.
(1) The Enterprise Value does not include transaction fees and expenses.
(2) Equity from PE Sponsor does not in all cases include the value of the management rollover.
Source: own sample data and calculations. 2 The right-hand side lists the amounts of capital needed to complete the takeover. Typical positions are the purchase price of target's equity, the rollover equity of the retained management into the new business (sometimes included into the equity purchase price), the repayment of existing debt as well as the costs emerging from the takeover. In this example a portion of the existing debt of the target company is retained and listed on both sides. The left-hand side shows the sources of capital to fund the takeover. Beside multiple layers of debt, equity from the Private Equity investors, the rolled-over management options as well as cash at hand of target (in this case dividends from a subsidiary) are typical positions. The overall debt is divided into 5 tranches of first lien senior secured loans and 3 tranches of senior secured second lien notes. A fraction of the pre-LBO debt is retained after the takeover. The tranches in this package have subsequent claims regarding interest and principal payments and collateral, which results in different terms and margins. 4 The two revolving credit facilities expect fees on undrawn amounts and have limited Letter of Credits and Swingline borrowings. The second revolver also offers a certain level of borrowing in different currencies. The term loan A has a predefined progressive quarterly amortization schedule. The two B tranches require amortization of 25 basis points (bps) per quarter and the payment of 50% of the defined excess cash flow of the borrower with the remainder payable at maturity. All first lien facilities include a performance pricing which reduces margins and excess cash payments once the total debt to EBITDA ratio drops below certain levels. The 3 notes tranches have a second lien claim against the company's assets. Whereas the first two notes tranches require interest payments in cash, the 3 rd tranche gives the borrower the option to skip interest payments in the first 5 years until maturity. This table shows the value of the debt and amortization tax shield as a fraction of the paid premium, the onemonth adjusted paid premium, the two-months adjusted paid premium and the pre-LBO market capitalization for the median and mean company in our sample for different scenarios. We also count the number of companies for which the tax shield exceeds 100% of the premia in every scenario. Scenario one follows assumptions that determine a very fast repayment of debt principal, and hence result in smaller tax shields. The assumptions of scenario eight lead to a smaller repayment of outstanding debt principal; therefore the tax shields are at a higher end. Finally, we show details on the underlying assumptions that were the basis of every scenario. Fixed assumptions of every scenario are the usage of the last-twelve months normalized EBITDA and Capex, the most recent depreciation and amortization, and the amortization of transaction fees and expenses over seven years.
Source: own sample data and calculations. 
Table X -Tax Shield as a Determinant of LBO Premia
This table shows regressions of the LBO bid premium on various explanatory variables. The bid premium is the increase in the equity market capitalisation normalised by the enterprise value of the target before the bid. The increase in the equity market capitalisation compares the final LBO price to the market capitalisation 1 day, 1 month, and 2 months before the first announcement. The enterprise values (1 day, 1 month and 2 months before the LBO) are computed by taking these market values of equity and adding the book value of net debt. The tax shield is the capitalized incremental tax savings according to scenario 4 in Table IX . This is also normalised by the (1 day, 1 month or 2 month) enterprise value. Equity measures the fraction of the equity contribution from the private equity fund. 
Figure II -Transaction Premia to Equity and Enterprise Values
These figures show the relationship between the paid premia relative to a company's pre-LBO equity and enterprise values for the 1-day, 1-month and 2-months cases. The red squares in the first figure indicate the magnitudes of the differences at certain levels of the conventional equity premium. Dots above the diagonal line indicate companies that had a lower enterprise value than the equity value due to a negative amount of net debt. This figure shows the changes in the capital structure at approximated market values and the interest expenses for the average company in our sample. Prior to the announcement of a takeover the averaged equity value was $3.0 bn plus $0.87 bn of debt. The equity value increased to $3.7 bn according to the final bid price per share. Immediately after the LBO the company's capital structure almost changed to its opposite. The sponsors' equity contribution had an average of $1.2 bn. The LBO debt package had a size of $3.3 bn of which $2.0 bn were leveraged loans with the remainder of $1.3 bn in high-yield notes.
5
The average amount of interest expenses increased from $60 mn in the year before the LBO to $250 mn in the first year after the LBO. On top of these expenses comes an average amount of $20 mn of interest expenses resulting from payment in kind notes.
* The difference between the equity and debt funding of the LBO and the equity purchase price at premium plus the debt to retire results from the transaction costs plus the amount of restricted cash according to the new credit agreement.
Source: own sample data, calculations and illustration. 5 In fact, high yield notes are usually not yet a part of the capital structure immediately after the LBO as they have to be issued within the following 6-12 months. To fill this gap financial institutions commit a bridge loan at closing until the high yield notes are finally issued. These bridge loans obviously contain a similiar risk profile and hence a similar pricing as the issued high yield notes.
Figure IV -LBO-Debt Principal Repayment following two Scenarios
This figure shows the outstanding percentage of debt principal for two different extreme scenarios for the median and mean company in our sample. Scenario 8 follows assumptions that lead to a lower excess cash flow and a slower repayment of debt principal. The assumptions of scenario 1 result in higher excess cash flows that are entirely used to repay debt principal. Hence, the percentage of outstanding debt decreases comparably fast.
EBITDA growth rate of 10%, Percentage of future Capex of 80%, Capex growth rate of 5%, EBITDA projections and Capex projections, amortization of transaction fees and expenses, excess cash flow of 100% used as cash sweep, and no interest payments on PIK tranches.
Scenario 1:
EBITDA growth rate of 0%, Percentage of future Capex of 100%, Capex growth rate of 0%, no EBITDA and Capex projections, amortization of transaction fees and expenses, excess cash flow of 50% used as cash sweep, and interest payments on PIK tranches.
Scenario 8:
Source: own sample data, calculations and illustration. 
